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ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZED MENTALLY DISABLED




Few subjects are as paradoxical as that of making predictions in
the area of law and mental health. Lawyers have written' and lec-
tured2 extensively on what a poor job mental health professionals
usually do in predicting dangerousness, 3 a conclusion which seems to
reflect the bulk of expert opinion by a full range of behavioralists as
* Adapted from a speech given at the Touro Law School Symposium on Mental Health
Law, Feb. 13, 1986.
** Copyright 0 1986, by Michael L. Perlin. All rights reserved. Associate Professor, New
York Law School. B.A. Rutgers University, 1966; J.D. Columbia Law School, 1969; Director
of Division of Mental Health Advocacy in the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate.,
1974-82; Member Task Force on Legal and Ethical Issues of Presidents' Commission on
Mental Health, 1977-78.
1. See Perlin, The Supreme Court. The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant. Psychiat-
ric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbollsm" Dulling the Ake In
Barefoot's Achilles Heel. 3 N.Y.L. ScH. Hum. RTS. ANN. 91 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Bare-
foot's Ake]; Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative As-
saults and Legal Rejoinders 14 RUTGERS LI. 397 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Defense Under
Siege]; Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Burger's
Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets Theory in Parham v. J.R.. 9 BuLL. At. ACAD. Psycit-
ATRY & L. 149 (1981); PLOTKIN. Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461 (1977): FRIEDMAN. The Mentally Handicapped
Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1974); Litwack. The Role of Counsel
in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems. 62 CAUF. L REv. 816 (1974).
2. See M. Perlin, Adequacy of Forensic Psychiatric Evaluations, (Oct. 1977) (paper
presented to the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, annual national meeting); M.
Perlin, The Great Debate: Resolved - Psychiatrists Cannot Predict Dangerousness, (Oct.
1979) (paper presented to the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, annual national
meeting); M. Perlin The Use of Expert Witnesses in the Civil Commitment Process, (Dec.
1983) (paper presented to the Minnesota Mental Health Law Project CLE Seminar).
3. The prototype legal analysis in Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court Room, 62 CAUF. L REv. 693 (1974).
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well. 4 Ironically, it is a conclusion that has not, at least in a criminal
case context, been enthusiastically embraced by the United States
Supreme Court. 5
On the other hand, we expect that mental health professionals will
be able to do an excellent job at another sort of prediction: the pre-
diction of how courts will rule on a variety of legal issues involving
the continually-changing relationship between law and mental
health. To some extent, it is this sort of prediction which may well
be the centerpiece of attention for the indefinite future. While this is
a topic that may cause mental health professionals some free-floating
anxiety, it is also an issue which is in need of a measure of
clarification.
There is no question that, in recent years, we have seen a massive
proliferation of litigation involving all aspects of the law as it affects
mentally disabled persons. Litigated issues have involved the civil
rights of patients, the constitutional contours of the commitment
process,7 the interplay between criminal law and mental disability,'
and the impact of mental disability on traditional civil law princi-
ples.9 This litigation, one of the most "volatile"10 areas of the law,
has continued to grow "unabated"."" A look at the Supreme Court's
4. See American Psychiatric Ass'n, Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 28 (1974);
Cocozza & Steadman, Some Refinements in the Measurement and Prediction of Dangerous
Behavior, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1021 (1974); A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System
in Transition 33 (1975). See generally Defense Under Siege, supra note I, at 421-24.
5. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), and Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983). But cf. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and Jones, 463 U.S. at
371 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Barefoot's Ake, supra note 1, see also Margulies,
The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad:" Procedures for the Commitment and
Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 793 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978), modified 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 458 U.S. 1119
(1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), suppl. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
7. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979).
8. See, e.g.. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985).
9. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
10. See Perlin, Institutionalization and the Law, in PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN INSTITU-
TIONAL SETTINGS 75 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Institutionalization].
11. See Perlin, Recent Developments in Mental Health Law, 6 PSYCH. CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 539 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
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1986 docket, showing more than half a dozen more cases,' 2 under-
scores that "'fluxiness' is the only absolute."' 3
In few areas has there been as much controversy,14 confrontation
and contentiousness 15 as in the area of the right of institutionalized
mentally disabled persons to refuse the imposition of antipsychotic
drug treatment.' 6 Here, for a variety of reasons, including, but not
limited to, the patients' desire to avoid the full-range of now-well-
known side effects caused by many of the drugs in question,' 7 pa-
12. See. e.g.. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986) (use or defendant's silence
following arrest and Miranda warnings as evidence of his sanity violated due process clause);
Allen v. Illinois. 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986) (privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to
action brought under Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act; involuntary commitment alone
does not trigger full range of criminal procedural protections); Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct.
2595 (1986) (eighth amendment prohibits execution of insane prisoner); Smith v. Murray. 106
S. Ct. 2678 (1986) (procedural default rule, see Wainwright v. Sykes. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
barred relief in case where court-appointed psychiatrist, who failed to inform defendant of
such potential consequences, testified on state's behalf in sentencing phase of capital punish-
ment case); United States v. Galioto, 106 S. CL 2683 (1986) (equal protection challenge to
blanket statutory ban on purchase of firearms by ex-mental patients, see 18 U.S.C. §
922(d)(4). (g), (h), mooted by statutory amendments providing certain exceptions to policy.
see Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)); Colorado v.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (admissibility, under Miranda, of inculpatory statement made
by severely mentally disabled criminal defendant); see also United States v. Paralyzed Vcter-
ans of America, 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986) (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29
U.S.C. § 794, prohibiting discrimination against handicapped persons in "any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance," not applicable to commercial airlines); Arline v.
School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633
(1986) (applicability of section 504 to individual "afflicted with . . . tuberculosis").
13. Institutionalization, supra note 10, quoting Perlin, The Rights of the Mentally Handi-
capped, 98 N.J.L.J. 1057 (1975).
14. For a sampling of the relevant legal literature, see. e.g.. Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeu-
tic Orgy: Mental Patients Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L REv. 461 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Limiting the Orgy]; Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism and the
Constitution, 72 GEo. LJ. 1725 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Mental Hospital Drugs]; Rhoden,
The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L L REv. 363 (1980); Brooks,
The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 8 BULL. A ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 179 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Constitutional Right].
15. The rhetoric has certainly been contentious. Compare. e.g., Appelbaum and Gutheil,
The Patient Always Pays: Reflections on the Boston State Case and the Right to Rot, 5 MASs.
MED. 3 (1980), and Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case: "Involuntary Mind Control."
the Constitution, and the "Right to Rot," 137 Art. J. PSYCHIATRY 720 (1980), with Limiting
the Orgy. supra note 14. But see. e.g., Shah, Legal and Mental Health System Interactions:
Major Developments and Research Needs, 4 INT'L J. L & PSYCHIATRY 219, 234 (1981) (crit-
icizing "extravagant rhetoric").
16. While this issue is often simply referred to in the shorthand phrase "the right to refuse
treatment," the extended description more accurately focuses on some of the major questions
to be considered in any attempt to fully understand and explore the scope of the problems at
hand.
17. In addition, the toxic effects of the drugs in question became readily apparent:
Temporary muscular side effects (disappearing on drug termination); dystonic reac-
tions, such as muscle spasm in the eyes and face; irregular grimacing or writhing move-
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tients have sought judicial relief as a means of either terminating or
altering unwanted medical treatment.18
While some of the subsequent lawsuits may have been "unusually
contentious," 19 they have also established an agenda for the resolu-
tion of a "significant ethical conflict. ' 20 Here, it appears that "'pa-
tients' rights groups and their allies among the mental disability bar
and bench stand alone pitted against the remainder of the mental
health establishment, ' 2a a conflict which may be "perhaps the piv-
ments; tongue protrusion; akathisia (inability to stay still and agitation); and parkinson-
isms (drooling, muscle stiffness, shuffling gait and tremors). Nonmuscular effects
include drowsiness, weakness, dizziness, low blood pressure, dry mouth, blurred vision,
loss of sexual desire, frigidity, apathy, depression, constipation and diarrhea. Other seri-
ous, though less frequent effects include skin rash and skin discoloration, cardiovascular
disease and sudden death.
B. Furrow, Malpractice in Psychiatry 61 (1980) (footnotes omitted), citing, inter alia, Ayd, A
Survey of Drug-Induced Extrapyramidal Reacactions, 175 J.A.M.A. 1054 (1961). See for a
recent survey of deaths resulting from the administration of such drugs, Levenson, Neurololep-
tic Malignant Syndrome, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1137 (1985).
Of all of the side effects, however, the most feared, and the one which appears to be the
most irreversible, was found to be tardive dyskinesia:
The tongue, mouth and chin are common signs of tardive dyskinesia: the tongue
sweeps from side to side, the mouth opens and closes, and the jaw moves in all direc-
tions. Fingers, arms and legs may display comparable movements; swallowing, speech
or breathing can be affected as well. The movements are uncontrollable, although their
intensity varies from case to case. In severe cases, the involuntary movements impede
walking and even digestion. Health can be endangered, and often the victim's appear-
ance becomes grotesque. Tardive dyskinesia is common: estimates of the disorder's
prevalence rates (the proportion of patients with tardive dyskinesia at any particular
time) ranges as high as sixty-five percent; fifteen to twenty percent is a widely accepted
estimate. It can develop after prolonged drug exposure, normally six months or longer,
and usually persists throughout the patient's lifetime. There generally is no cure.
Mental Hospital Drugs, supra note 14, at 1742-43 (footnotes omitted), and sources
cited at id. nn.85-90.
18. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (plaintiff sought different medi.
cation regime); see generally Brotman, Behind the Bench on Rennie v. Klein, in REFUSINO
TREATMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS 31 (1979).
The social and ethical issue raised when patients express their desire to refuse medical treat-
ment are, of course, not new. See, e.g., Reiser, Refusing Treatment for Mental Illness: Histori-
cal and Ethical Dimensions, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 329 (1980) (dating problem to fifth cen-
tury B.C.); Blackwell, Schizophrenic and Neuroleptic Drugs: A Biopsychosicial Perspective,
in REFUSING TREATMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS 31 (1979).
19. Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging - Atomistic and Structural Remedies, 32 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 221, 222 (1983-84).
20. Sadoff, Patient Rights versus Patient Needs: Who Decides? 44 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIA-
TRY, 27, 28 (June 1983).
21. Brown, The Right to Refuse Treatment and the Movement for Mental Health Reform,
9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 291, 296 (1984).
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otal issue in the determination of the future direction of the relation-
ship between law and mental health. 22
There are two different, but overlapping, issues which are of seri-
ous concern and are the focal point of this Article: the scope and
significance of recent developments in both the constitutional and
tort law aspects of the right to refuse treatment. While there are
many points in common between the two areas, there are also some
significant differences, and it is helpful to point them out as well. In
addition, some recent suggestions which have been made for dealing
with the assessment of legal responsibility in cases where patients
develop irreversible side effects such as tardive dyskinesia, especially
in cases where they have not been afforded whatever constitutional
rights they might possess with regard to their right to refuse such
treatment, will be examined.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES23
It has now been nearly five years since the United States Supreme
Court issued its at-the-time baffling decision in Mills v. Rogers,24
which appeared to sidestep the critical question of constitutional law
which it had agreed to review in that case: "whether involuntarily
committed mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs."25
The Court's decision clearly left a spate of unanswered ques-
tions;26 one commentator characterized it as "extinguish[ing]" the
right to refuse, 27 while another observed that, in its aftermath, "the
frustration and confusion among administrators and staff on state
mental health facilities concerning the right to refuse remains un-
22. Perlin, The Right to Refuse Treatment: A New Right Emerges. I ADvOCAcY Now: J.
OF PATIENT RTs. & MENTAL HEALTH ADVOr. 8 (1979).
23. Much of the material accompanying notes 24-193 is adapted from Perlin, The Right to
Refuse Treatment, 6 Directions in Psychiatry, Lesson 14 (1986).
24. 457 U.S. 291 (1982). See generally infra text accompanying notes 41-51.
25. Id. at 293. At the same time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the other major
right to refuse treatment case, Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). and remanded that case
for reconsideration under the then-recently announced "right to training" decision in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307. 317 (1982).
For an update on post-Youngberg developments, see Perlin, Ten Years After:. Evolving
Mental Health Advocacy and Judicial Trends, 15 FORDHANS URi. L.J. (in Press).
26. Perlin, Patients' Rights, in PSYCHIATRY, ch. 35, at 1, 6 (Cavenar Ed. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Patients' Rights].
27. Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Men-
tally I11, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1720, 1727 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Common Law Remedy].
This interpretation has proven to be unduly negative. See Infra notes 89-93, 105-93 and ac-
companying text.
1986]
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changed."2 8 However, an examination of lower courts' response to
and interpretations of Mills reveals a near-unanimous body of law
declaring that the right does, in fact, exist. A closer look at these
developments should help clarify the extent of the right, the type of
remedial processes needed to insure enforcement of the right, and
some indication of how far the right has actually been extended.
A. Before the Mills Decision
The outlines of the right to refuse treatment29 doctrine began to
fill in with the litigation of the two cases 30 universally acknowledged
to have set the stage for the legal debate on the extent and contours
of the right." A brief recapitulation of these cases indicates the
scope of the issue involved.32
In the first case, Rennie v. Klein,3 3 the Third Circuit substantially
affirmed a District Court of New Jersey decision that held that in-
voluntarily committed mental patients retained a qualified constitu-
tional right to refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs that
might have "permanently disabling side effects. '3 4 This decision was
premised on the "liberty" section of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 5 In the course of its decision, the circuit
cited what it characterized as "dramatic" evidence in the record that
"the risk of serious side effects stemming from the administration of
antipsychotic drugs is a critical factor in our determination that a
liberty interest is infringed by forced medication."38
28. Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients' Right to Refuse
Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 132 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Current Status].
29. Unless otherwise specified, this doctrine should be construed to deal solely with refusal
of antipsychotic drugs. For analyses of cases involving the right to refuse other drugs (used
punitively as "aversive therapy") or to refuse such modalities of treatment as psychosurgery,
see Patients' Rights, supra note 26, at 4-5; see generally Limiting the Orgy. supra note 14.
30. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl. 475 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979), modified 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 458 U.S. 1119 (1982);
Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Mills v. Rog-
ers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
31. See Weiner, Supreme Court Decisions on Mental Health: A Review, 33 HosP. & Com-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 461 (1982).
32. The text accompanying notes 33-41, infra, and the sources cited in those notes, is from
Patients' Rights, supra note 26, at 5, 16. See also Perlin, Mental Health Law and the Su-
preme Court, 3 Directions in Psychiatry, Lesson 5 (1983); Recent Developments, supra note
11; Perlin, The United States Supreme Court and Mental Health Law: A Retrospective, 4
MEDICINE & L. 49 (1985).
33. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
34. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 843-45.
35. Id. at 844.
36. Id. at 843 n.8.
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On the other hand, the court sharply limited the extent of due
process protections available to patients who chose to exercise the
right. The informal mandates of a state administrative policy, which
called for treatment team consultations with outside psychiatrists,
satisfied minimal constitutional law requirements.37 The type of
more stringent protections previously ordered by the district court
(including formal hearings to be held before psychiatrists acting as
factfinders)38 were not required.
In Rogers v. Okin,39 the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that
patients had a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by
the state to decide whether or not to submit to "serious and poten-
tially harmful medical treatment represented by the administration
of antipsychotic drugs." 40 The circuit court remanded the case to the
District Court in Massachusetts . . .to develop procedures (presum-
ably as the district court had done in Rennie) to insure that the pa-
tients' legal rights would be protected in a practical way.
41
Both federal appeals courts found that the fact of commitment is
not equivalent to a finding that an involuntary patient cannot retain
some measure of autonomy in treatment decision-making, that such
commitment is not an implicit finding of incompetency and that the
"intrusivity" of "serious and potentially harmful medical treatment"
is sufficient so that a risk/benefit calculus of some sort (taking side-
effects into account) must be employed before the decision of a com-
petent patient to refuse treatment can be overridden.
B. The Mills Decision
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court sidestepped the con-
stitutional questions raised by Mills, by remanding the case to the
First Circuit Court of Appeals for that court to consider the impact
of an intervening Massachusetts state court decision.42
37. Id. at 848-51.
38. Id. at 840.
39. 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980). vacated and remanded sub. nora. Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291 (1982).
40. Id. at 653.
41. Id. at 660-61.
42. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 306 (1982).
There, in In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981), Massachusetts' highest
court had held that a noninstitutionalized, mentally incompetent patient had a right to a judi-
cial hearing at which he could assert his desire to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs.
id. at 51-52, a conclusion the state court had based "expressly ... on the common law of
Massachusetts as well as on the Federal Constitution." Mills. 457 U.S. at 301. Although Roe
dealt only with the noninstitutionalized, the Supreme Court accepted plainilffs' arguments
1986]
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A closer reading of the text of Mills, however, reveals some sub-
stantive consideration by the Supreme Court of the underlying legal
doctrines in question. First, the Court noted that all parties agreed
that "the Constitution recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"4 3 but observed that
the core dispute focused on the definition of that interest and identi-
fication of the conditions under which it might be outweighed by
competing state interests." Second, the Court specifically "as-
sume[d] ...that involuntarily committed mental patients do retain
liberty interests protected directly by the Constitution"4 and that
these interests are implicated by the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs."48
However, even given these starting points of analysis, the Court
restated a major principle of constitutional litigation: a state is al-
ways free, either under its own state constitution or under the com-
mon law, to create liberty or other due process interests broader than
those minimally mandated by the federal Constitution; 47 interests
which might be substantive"8 or procedural."
that "[Roe] may influence the correct disposition of the case at hand," id. at 302-03, and thus
ordered the First Circuit to reconsider its Rogers opinion in light of Roe, id. at 306.
Although the plaintiff in Roe had been incompetent, he still was entitled to have "substi-
tuted judgment" exercised on his behalf. Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 51. This determination was "best
made in courts of competent jurisdiction," id. at 52, and six factors were identified as guiding
such decision-making: (1) the ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) the
ward's religious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability of adverse
side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis with treatment
id. at 57. See Mills, 457 U.S. at 304 n.19.
43. Mills, 457 U.S. at 299. While defendants conceded that plaintiffs had a constitutional
interest in freedom from bodily invasion, they denied that it was a "fundamental" interest and
asserted that it, in employing an appropriate balancing test, was outweighed by "compelling
state interests" in the administration of the drugs. Id. n.15.
44. Id. at 299.
45. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involuntary transfer of a mental patient to a
mental hospital violates a liberty interest that is guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
46. Mills, 457 U.S. at 299 n.16.
47. Id. at 300.
48. Id., citing, inter alia, Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
49. Because state-created liberty interests are entitled to federal due process protection, see,
e.g., Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488, "the full scope of a patient's due process rights may depend in
part on the substantive liberty interests created by state as well as federal law." Mills, 457
U.S. at 300. "Moreover, a State may confer procedural protections of liberty interests that
extend beyond those minimally required by the Constitution of the United States. If a State
does so, the minimal requirements of the Federal Constitution would not be controlling, and
would not need to be identified in order to determine the legal rights and duties of persons
within the State." Id.
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Thus, the Court projected, it was "distinctly possible" that Massa-
chusetts recognizes substantive liberty interests of incompetents
"that are broader" than those recognized by the federal Constitu-
tion,5° as well as greater procedural protection of relevant liberty in-
terests "than the minimum adequate to survive scrutiny under the
Due Process Clause.""1
The Court ultimately chose to remand Mills for reconsideration of
the state law principles articulated in Roe,82 in part because of an-
other well-established doctrine of constitutional adjudication that
taught that federal constitutional decisions should be avoided wher-
ever possible.8 3
C. The Rennie Remand
To make matters even more perplexing, just one week after the
Court issued its decision in Rogers, it granted certiorari in Rennie v.
Klein," and vacated and remanded to the Third Circuit for reconsid-
eration, not in light of Mills, but in light of the Court's contempora-
neous right to training decision in Youngberg v. Romeo."
D. Unanswered Questions
The Court's ruling in Mills left many unanswered questions:
1. What would be the practical impact of the Supreme Court's
decision to sidestep the merits in Rogers?80
2. Would the Court ever hear another right to refuse treatment
case?
57
50. Mills, 457 U.S. at 303, comparing Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 51, to Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979).
51. Mills, 457 U.S. at 303-04, comparing Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 51, to Youngberg v. Romeo.
457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982), and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979).
52. Inre Roe, 383 Mass. 415,421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981) (see note42 for six factors to be
followed in probate proceedings).
53. Mills, 457 U.S. at 305, citing, inter alia, City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S.
283, 294 (1982); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 US. 288, 341, 347-48
(1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
54. Rennie, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
55. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
56. See, e.g., Current Status. supra note 28, at 132; see also Brant, The Hostility of the
Burger Court to Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, I BuLL. A. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 77, 83 (1983) (criticizing court's inaction as abdication of its responsibility to proide
needed guidance to lower federal courts and to public officials) [hereinafter cited as Hostility].
57. Although it granted certiorari in Ake v. Oklahoma, 663 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App.
1983), revd, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), on the question of whether a state can constitutionally force
a criminal defendant to be heavily sedated with Thorazine while attending criminal proceed-
ings against him in absence of any evidence that he failed to conduct himself properly in court,
1986]
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3. If the Court did take such a case arising from a state without a
well-developed body of state right to refuse treatment law (unlike,
e.g., Massachusetts), how far would the Court go in defining the
dimensions of a constitutional right? Rogers seemed to imply that
the Court would be willing to make some such finding, via its allu-
sion to the issue of the drugs' "significant side effects" 8; how much
of a finding would it make?
4. However the Court ultimately defines the right (if it chooses to
do so), how much procedural due process will be necessary to vindi-
cate it?59
5. How would the Court deal with a case that involved a patient's
desire to refuse drugs beyond the range of antipsychotics that were
at the heart of both Rennie and Rogers?0
6. How would the Court deal with a right to refuse treatment case
arising in a community setting?61
7. Finally, how would the Courts of Appeals "read" the Supreme
Court's Rogers decision? Would they construe it expansively, nar-
rowly, or would they confine it to its fact-specific setting?
Although few of these questions have been answered dispositively,
consideration of the subsequent developments in both of the main
the Supreme Court ultimately decided Ake without reaching the question. See 53 U.S.L.W.
4179 (1984). See generally Barefoot's Ake. supra note I.
58. Mills, 457 U.S. at 293-94 n.l. Note that the Court cited to both the literature which
asserted that drug treatment was "essential not only to the treatment of individual disorders,
but also to the preservation of institutional order generally needed for effective therapy," as
well as that which emphasized that "antipsychotic drugs carry a significant risk of adverse side
effects," id., including, specifically, tardive dyskinesia, id. (citing Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979); and Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in
L. GOODMAN AND A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 152 (5th cd.
1975)).
59. Cf. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 848-51 (weighing a New Jersey state regulation against the
dictates of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)), and see, e.g., Parham v. JR.,
442 U.S. 584, 606-10 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 839 n.2 ("only the antipsychotics are the subject of our
opinion here").
61. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("As a general matter, the State is
under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border.").
In one subsequent case, the Third Circuit rejected a Rennie argument made by a convicted
criminal whose probationary term mandated participation in a group therapy program, noting
that "the infringement of which [appellant] complains falls outside the range of facts to which
[Rennie] ...might be applied by reasonable analogy." United States v. Stine, 675 F.2d 69,
71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110 (1982). On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
added, "We need not and do not hold that a psychological counseling requirement can never
be an infringement of a constitutional right of privacy. We hold only that when psychological
counseling is reasonably related to the purposes of probation, its imposition is not unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 72.
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cases, as well as decisions in other jurisdictions, may help add per-
spective to some of these matters.
E. Rogers on Remand
Initially, the First Circuit certified6 2 the case directly to the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for that court to respond to nine
questions "which focus on the right of involuntarily committed
mental patients to refuse treatment and the standards and proce-
dures which must be followed to treat these patients with antipsy-
chotic medication.363
In a unanimous opinion premised solely on state statutory and
common law, 64 the state court concluded"5 (1) that a committed
mental patient was competent to make treatment decisions "until the
patient is adjudicated incompetent by a judge,"60 (2) that, where
there is such an incompetency adjudication, the judge, "using a sub-
stituted judgment standard,67 shall decide whether the patient would
62. Approximately half of the states have enacted statutes which enable federal courts to
certify unresolved questions of state law directly to the state courts for those courts to answer.
See generally C. WRI.owr FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 313-15 (1983); see also, e.g., Lillich and
Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questlons, 18 UCLA L REV. 888
(1971).
63. Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health. 390 Mass. 489. 458 N.E.2d 308. 310
(Mass. 1983). This aspect of the Rogers litigation is discussed extensively in Note, Medical
Law - The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: Substantive Rights and Proce-
dural Guidelines in Massachusetts, 7 W. NEw ENG. L REV. 125 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Medical Law].
64. Because the United States Supreme Court predicated its remand solely on the state
court's earlier decision in In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415. 421 N.F_.2d 40 (1981), see Mills. 457
U.S. at 301-03, and because Roe did not construe the state constitution, the state court felt its
answers to the certified questions were limited to state statutory and common law. See Rogers.
458 N.E.2d at 312 n.7. See also, e.g., Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526. 223 Cal.
Rptr. 746, 747 (Ct. App. 1986) (state prisoners have state statutory right to refuse long term
treatment with antipsychotic drugs absent a judicial determination that they are incompltent
to do so).
65. The court's specific answers to the certified questions are summarized in Rogers, 458
N.E.2d at 322-23.
66. Id. at 310. In coming to this decision, the court considered both state statutory law
which specifies that a patient is not to be deemed incompetent to manage his affairs solely by
reason of commitment to a mental hospital, see id. at 313. construing MAss. GEN. LAw ANN.
ch. 123, § 25, (West 1986) and which fails to require incompetency as prerequisite for com-
mitment, see Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 313, construing MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, §§ 7(a),
8(a) (West 1986), as well as state case law. See Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981)
and In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (in sterilization cases, guardian must
obtain prior judicial approval before they may either consent to or refuse proposed "extraordi-
nary" medical treatment), discussed in Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 313.
67. The court specified that the six factors set out in Roe, see supra note 52. be considered
in the substituted judgment assessment. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 323.
TOURO LAW REVIEW
have consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs" 8 and
(3) that no state interest justified the use of such drugs "in a non-
emergency situation without the patient's consent."6 9 On the other
hand, a patient could be treated against his will and without prior
court approval to prevent the "immediate, substantial, and irreversi-
ble deterioration of a serious mental illness." 70
In addition, the court held that when such drugs were "used to
prevent violence to third persons, to prevent suicide, or to preserve
security," they were being used as "chemical restraints" and any
such use must thus comply with state restraints/seclusion statutes,
and accompanying regulations. 1
Following the state certification decision, the case was again trans-
ferred to the First Circuit which ruled that the due process protec-
tions outlined by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were
"substantive rights created by legitimate, objective expectations de-
rived from state law [and] entitled to the procedural protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment, '7 2 and that these rights "equal or ex-
ceed the rights provided in the federal Constitution." '
The Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to the district court
so that the court could "issue a declaration stating that the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court's recognition of substantive and
procedural rights of involuntarily committed mentally ill patients in
Massachusetts created for such patients a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. 7 4
F. Rennie on Remand
The Rennie case was somewhat more confusing. On remand, a
sharply-fractured7 5 Third Circuit reiterated the basic underlying
substantive premise of its earlier decision, that involuntarily commit-
68. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 310. For a critical view of this aspect of Rogers, and one endors-
ing, instead, the suggestion of the trial court in Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147-49
(D.N.J. 1978), that independent psychiatrists be used as decision-makers in such cases, see
Note, Medical Law, supra note 63, at 144-45, and sources cited at id. nn.151-57.
69. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 311.
70. Id. In such cases, if the doctor expects to continue to treat the patient over the latter's
objections, the doctor must seek an adjudication of incompetency; if the patient is adjudicated
incompetent, the court must formulate a substituted judgment plan. Id.
71. Id. at 310-11. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 21 (West 1986), and MAss. AD-
MIN. CODE, tit. 104, § 3.12 (1978).
72. Rogers, 738 F.2d at 6.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. See Rennie, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1963). There were five separate opinions released,
with no more than three judges joining in any one opinion.
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ted patients do have a constitutional right to refuse the administra-
tion of certain antipsychotic drugs.7 6 It also reaffirmed that the pro-
cedures specified in the state administrative bulletin satisfied due
process requirements, 77 and remanded to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings.78
On the other hand, it found that, after Youngberg, the concept of
least intrusive means could no longer be employed.79 Instead, the ac-
cepted professional judgment standard of Youngberg,8 ° i.e., a deci-
sion to administer medication would be presumed to be valid unless
it was shown to be a "substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice or standards," 8' was to be substituted. 2
A close analysis of the multiple opinions83 reveals, further, that
the circuit carefully considered the elements of accepted professional
judgment, so that it could make the necessary assessment required
by Youngberg. Thus, a majority of the judges felt that the determi-
nation required both an evaluation of side effects and an investiga-
tion of other treatment options. Also, a majority similarly rejected
warehousing or administrative convenience as a justification for for-
cibly drugging patients.84
The court unanimously determined that before a patient could be
medicated against his will, it was necessary that a professional find
him to be dangerous to himself or others. A majority felt that this
standard must be met by a higher standard than the regular involun-
tary civil commitment criteria (i.e., simple dangerousness is not a
sufficient basis upon which the state can predicate the forcible medi-
cation of a patient). Three judges would have reinstated the least
intrusive means test as well.85 Judge Gibbons, adhering to his dissent
76. Id. at 269 (Garth J., opinion).
77. Id. at 270 n.9.
78. Id. On remand, the district court would be free to consider, inter alia, the relevance of
the Bill of Rights of the federal Mental Health Systems Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 9501, to -the
remaining proceedings." Rennie, 720 F.2d at 270 n.10 (quoting Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836,
852 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981) (Weis, J., concurring).
79. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269 (Garth, J., opinion).
80. 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
81. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269 (Garth, J., opinion) (quoting Youngberg, 457 US. 307. 323).
82. The abandonment of the "least intrusive means" test was ordered over the pointed ob-
jections of four judges. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 276-77 (Weis, J., concurring) and Id. at 277
(Gibbons, J., dissenting).
83. See supra note 47.
84. The standard accepted by the court is to balance the "legitimate interest of the State
and the rights of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom
from unreasonable restraints." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
85. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 276 (Weis, J., concurring) ("I fear that the latitude the majority
allows in 'professional judgment' jeopardizes adequate protection of a patient's constitutional
1986]
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in the Third Circuit's original Rennie opinion,8 6 would have rein-
stated all of the district court's original injunction. a On remand, the
district court merely entered a brief order, consented to by all par-
ties, permanently enjoining defendants to comply with the most re-
cent version of Administrative Bulletin 78-3, adding that the injunc-
tion "shall in no way affect the plaintiffs' rights or remedies under
New Jersey state law." 88
G. Other Jurisdictions
How have Rogers and Rennie been dealt with in other jurisdic-
tions? Responses have been mixed: other courts have interpreted the
scope of the right to refuse treatment both broadly and narrowly.
While many courts have continued to endorse the earlier Renniel
Rogers model, others have read those cases more restrictively in
light of the Supreme Court's decisions. At least two cases, however,
have resurrected the "least restrictive alternative" test that the Third
Circuit abandoned in its Rennie remand opinion.
1. Broad readings of the right to refuse treatment
Where an incarcerated plaintiff alleged that she had been injected
with a psychotropic drug against her will, the District of Columbia
District Court ruled that a trial would be necessary to resolve factual
disputes which remained in the case on such questions as whether a
less intrusive alternative might have been satisfactorily employed by
defendants.89 The district court also concluded that "the reasoning in
[the courts of appeals' opinions in] Rogers and Rennie, . remains
persuasive,"90 and states the appropriate legal standards.
rights"). Judge Weis specifically found that "[t]he consequences of error [involving the perma-
nent side effects of antispychotic drugs] are far more serious ... than those of Romeo's physi-
cal restraints and therefore, a standard commensurate with the potential harm to the patient is
required." Id. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310 n.4 (" 'soft' restraints . . .were generally
used").
86. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 865.
87. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 277 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
88. Rennie v. Klein, No. 77-2624 (D.N.J., Aug. 16, 1984) (consent order).
89. Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026, 1036 (D.D.C. 1983) (Plaintiff re-
fused treatment on the grounds of her beliefs as a Christian Scientist, which forbade her to
receive injections. The District of Columbia District Court ruled that summary judgment was
improper to decide issues such as the plaintiff's competency to decide to refuse treatment, the
immediacy of the alleged emergency, the scope of the danger posed to plaintiff and others, as
well as the availability of less restrictive alternatives.).
90. Id., at 1031-32 n.l.
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In weighing a challenge to New York's involuntary medication
practices in Project Release v. Prevost, the Second Circuit stated
that while "Mills did not definitively resolve the question of whether
a liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication exists as a fed-
eral constitutional matter, the case appears to indicate that there is
such an interest."91 Mills countenanced the creation of such an in-
terest under state law,92 and the Court of Appeals found that such a
right did exist under New York State law.93
Subsequent to the Project Release decision, a New York state
court found the rationale of Rogers and Rennie persuasive notwith-
standing the Supreme Court remand (which it characterized as
merely seeking to answer the question of whether "State law pro-
vided a broader protected right than was afforded by the [federal]
Constitution") .94
91. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). In an
action challenging the constitutionality of the voluntary, involuntary, and emergency commit-
ment procedures of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, the Second Circuit discussed the
question of the right to refuse antipsychotic medication on federal constitutional grounds, cit-
ing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). The court indicated that this question is still un-
resolved. However, the Supreme Court in Mills assumed for purposes of discussion that invol-
untarily committed mental patients do retain liberty interests protected by the Constitution.
and these interests are implicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Cf. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d
337, 504 N.YS.2d 74 (1986), discussed infra notes 123-43 and accompanying texL
92. Id., (citing Mills, 457 U.S. at 299.)
93. Id. However, although the Court of Appeals did find that a right to refuse treatment did
exist, the court also determined that minimum Due Process Standards were met by NY AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 14, § 27.8-.9 (1975). Citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 335 (1976).
which dealt with the question of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires an evidentiary hearing before the termination of Social Security disability benefits,
the Court of Appeals examined the three factors set forth by the Supreme Court to be consid-
ered in assessing the adequacy of State Agency proceedings under the Due Process Clause.
These factors are (I) the private interests implicated, (2) the risk of an erroneous decision, and
(3) the governmental interest. Applying these factors to N.Y. AoIN. CODE tit. 14, § 27.8-.9,
the Court of Appeals found that the requirements of Due Process were satisfied.
94. Savastano v. Saribeyoglu, 126 Misc. 2d 52, 53, 480 N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984). An application was brought on behalf of a patient at a mental health facility to vacate
a determination by staff physicians to treat the patient with psychotropic drugs. The court
ruled that since the patient was institutionalized pursuant to a court order of retention as an
involuntary patient. A predicate for such an order is that the patient does not understand the
need for treatment. This situation provides a sufficient basis for the professional determination
to administer treatment without the consent of the patient. However, the court did recognize
that, in furtherance of the patient's liberty interest, he may refuse treatment absent an emer-
gency situation or a finding that he is incapable of understanding the need for treatment.
See also Rivers, supra note 91.
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Similar decisions were reached by the Arizona95 and New Hamp-
shire96 Supreme Courts, as well as an intermediate appellate court in
Colorado.97 Also, a series of consent orders have been entered else-
where, in jurisdictions including California and Vermont, that basi-
cally track the approaches and procedures approved by the First and
Third Circuits prior to the Supreme Court's 1982 remands. 8
2. Narrow readings of the right to refuse treatment
On the other hand, several cases have interpreted the right to re-
fuse treatment relatively restrictively following the Supreme Court's
remand in Mills.
A federal court in Texas rejected plaintiffs' argument that the
First Circuit's original opinion in Rogers had "binding application"
on the question of the extent of patients' right to refuse treatment. 99
The court pointed out that (1) the Circuit's decision had been va-
cated and remanded by the Supreme Court, and (2) it had "relied
95. Anderson v. Arizona, 663 P.2d 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). The Court of Appeals of
Arizona reversed the trial court's order to administer psychotropic drugs to an involuntary
patient at the Arizona state hospital. The court ruled that until the State could produce copies
of (1) an individualized written treatment plan, (2) official department regulations governing
the use of seclusion and restraint in non-emergency cases against the will of the patient, and
(3) written agency procedures regarding the use of seclusion and restraint in non-emergency
cases against the will of the patient, due process protects the patient's liberty interest to refuse
treatment.
96. Opinion of the Justice, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. Supp. Ct. 1983). The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire gave its opinion on proposed legislation regarding administration of compul-
sory medication to involuntary mental patients under certain conditions, and stated that the
state Constitution did provide mentally ill persons, like all other persons, with certain funda-
mental liberty interests.
97. People in the Interest of Medina, 662 P.2d 184 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). The Colorado
Court of Appeals held that an order to administer psychotropic drugs to an involuntarily com-
mitted mental patient was improper where no emergency existed, evidence was insufficient to
enable the court to make findings regarding relevant factors, no attempt was made to commu-
nicate with the patient to determine his wishes and concerns, and the authorization was coex-
tensive with the patient's certification with no provision for review.
98. See, e.g., Jamison v. Farabee, No. C 780445 WHO (N.D. Cal., April 26, 1983), re-
ported in 7 MENT. Dis. L. RPrR. 436 (1983); J.L. v. Miller, No. S-418084-WnC (Vt. Super.
Ct., Washington Cty., May 20, 1985), reported in 9 MENT. & PHYS. Dis. L. REp. 261 (1985).
For an early analysis of Jamison, see Bishop, The Expanding Rights of Mental Patients,
CALIF. LAW. (Sept. 1984), at 69.
99. R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (N.D. Tex. 1984). The United States District
Court reviewed a proposed commissioner's rule governing the manner in which a patient's
consent must be sought prior to the administration of psychotropic drugs, holding that the
proposed rule adequately protected the rights of involuntarily committed patients, in light of
the standards enunciated in Youngberg.
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heavily on the rather extensive body of statutory and common law of
Massachusetts." 100
In a district court case from Wisconsin involving a patient found
not guilty by reason of insanity, the court rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the state statutory scheme violated his constitutionally
protected liberty interests in that it permitted nonconsensual drug
treatment in other than emergency situations.10' Since, under state
law, the plaintiffs' commitment was specifically for "custody, care
and treatment," 0 2 the court construed the involuntary commitment
to be "a finding of incompetency with regard to treatment deci-
sions, 10 3 and reasoned that "[n]onconsensual treatment is what in-
voluntary commitment is all about."'"
3. Resurrection of the least restrictive alternative?
At least three post-Mills cases, however, have employed the con-
cept of the least restrictive alternative in refusal of treatment mat-
ters.0 5 In Bee v. Greaves,0 6 the Tenth Circuit, in an expansive read-
ing of a case emanating from a Utah county jail concerning a
pretrial detainee's right to refuse treatment, ruled that "less restric-
tive alternatives, such as segregation or the use of less controversial
drugs like tranquilizers or sedatives, should be ruled out before
resorting to antipsychotic drugs." 0 7
The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that pretrial de-
tainees retain certain constitutional rights. In holding that these
rights include a liberty interest in "avoiding unwanted medication
100. Id.
101. Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis. 1985). Wisconsin state law stipu-
lates that, generally, one could not be deemed incompetent by reason of admission to a mental
health facility. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.59(l) (West 1985). "No person is deemed incompe-
tent. . . solely by reason of his or her admission to a facility in accordance with this chapter
of detention or committment under this chapter." However, the statute specifically does not
authorize the refusal of treatment. § 51.59 (2). "This section does not authorize an individual
who has been involuntarily committed or detained under this chapter to refuse treatment dur-
ing such committment or detention." Id. See § 51.61 (l)(g), "[Flollowing a final committment
order, the subject individual does not have the right to refuse medication and treatment except
as provided by this section." See also id. § 51.61(l)(h). Patients retain the right to be free
from "unnecessary or excessive medication."
102. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(l) (West 1985).
103. Stensvad, 601 F. Supp. at 131.
104. Id.
105. In addition to the cases discussed infra in text accompanying notes 101-115. see also
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
106. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984). cert. denied. 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985).
107. Id. at 1396.
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with [antipsychotic] drugs," 108 the court reasoned that such an indi-
vidual generally has a "constitutionally protected interest in making
his own decision whether to accept or reject the administration of
potentially dangerous drugs,"'109 as well as a first amendment right
protecting the "communication of ideas." 0
The court found that any decision to forcibly administer antipsy-
chotic drugs "must be the product of professional judgment by ap-
propriate medical authorities, applying accepted medical stan-
dards."-"" Such a decision requires an evaluation in each case "of all
relevant circumstances, including the nature and gravity of the
safety threat, the characteristics of the individual involved, and the
likely effects of particular drugs. 1112
In addition, the court held that "the availability of alternative, less
restrictive courses of action should also be considered."' 13 Because of
the severe side effects of the drugs, "forcible medication cannot be
viewed as a reasonable response to a safety or security threat if there
exist 'less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.' ""'
On this point, the court of appeals noted that, while the Supreme
Court declined to apply a less intrusive means analysis in Youngberg
v. Romeo," 5 that case was distinguishable because it involved "tem-
porary physical restraints rather than mental restraints with poten-
tially long-term effects,"" 6 and because the plaintiff there was se-
verely retarded and unable to care for himself." 7 Because the
108. Id. at 1394.
109. Id. at 1392-93 (citing Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931-32 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
tracing the history of right to refuse treatment and indicating that a person's interest in mak-
ing decisions regarding his body is recognized in tort law, and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977), recognizing a privacy interest in making certain kinds of important decisions).
110. Id. at 1393-94 (quoting Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 927-29, and citing to the
trial court opinion in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979)).
111. Id. at 1393. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982), and Rennie v.
Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) Shelton was an action
brought by teachers and others challenging the constitutionality of a state statute which re-
quired public school teachers to file affidavits regarding organizations to which they belonged,
or contributed to, as a prerequisite of employment.
115. 457 U.S. at 322-23.
116. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7 (citing Rennie, 720 F.2d at 274-77 (Weis, J., concurring)).
117. Id. (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310). For an analysis concluding that Bee distin-
guished Youngberg for the wrong reasons see Note, Bee v. Greaves: Pretrial Detention and the
Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs - A Missed Opportunity to Protect
Fundamental Rights, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 836, 852-53 (1985) (Bee, unlike Youngberg, in-
volved a pretrial detainee; Supreme Court policy of institutional deference limited to mental
institutions).
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plaintiff in Bee was not mentally incompetent and because of the
proposed use of a "potentially dangerous drug,"118 "we believe the
state is required to consider less restrictive alternatives. 11 0
Bee thus stands for the proposition that one circuit has shown a
willingness to use the least restrictive alternative test to weigh re-
fusal of treatment claims in the context of a population generally
seen as less in need of court protection than those institutionalized in
facilities for the mentally disabled. 120
The least restrictive alternative approach of the Bee case has sub-
sequently been implicitly adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in
a case involving an incompetent patient.1 21 In establishing that the
mental health professional who wishes to medicate an objecting in-
competent patient must satisfy this standard, the court specified:
Here the focus encompasses not only the gravity of any harmful ef-
fects from the proposed treatment but also the existence, feasibility
and efficacy of alternative methods of treating the patient's condition
or of alleviating the danger created by that condition. If less intrusive
methods are available to effectively redress these concerns, then
clearly the court should deny the motion for nonconsensual
treatment.1 22
4. Significance of Rivers v. Katz?
Most recently, the New York Court of Appeals issued what ap-
pears to be the broadest right to refuse treatment opinion yet de-
i18. 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7. The drug in question in Bee was Thorazine, 744 F.2d at 1389-
91.
119. 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7. For other conflicting readings of Rennie on this point, see Sten-
svad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wis 1985), and R.AJ. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp.
1310, 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (Plaintiffs representing patients at eight state mental hospitals in
Texas, brought an action against representatives of the Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation for failing to comply with several provisions of a settlement agreement.
The court, in discussing the broad range of equitable powers available to effectuate its orders,
directed defendants to comply with the agreement. Id. at 1319).
120. See also Bunn, More Meaningful Protection for the Right to Refuse Antipsychotie
Drugs: Bee v. Greaves, 62 CHi. KENr. L RE V. 323, 340 (1985) (Bees "refinemcnt of the
professional judgment standard clearly provides more meaningful protection for the right to
refuse antipsychotic drugs"; impact of case's protection of plaintiffs at trial still "unclear");
Note, "'Bee v. Greaves: A Pre-trial Detainee's Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 63 DEN. U.L REv. 273, 289-90 (1986).
Bee sidestepped the Supreme Court's tacit ruling, see, Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982),
that medication decision making should be evaluated by the professional judgment standard
set forth in Youngberg.
121. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 963 (Colo. 1985). Medina cited Bee on this point. Id.
at 967 n.2.
122. Id. at 974.
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cided by an appellate court, and the broadest opinion decided by any
court since the remand opinion in Rennie. 23 In Rivers v. Katz, 124 the
court ordered that in most cases, 125 a judicial determination "of
whether the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision
with respect to proposed treatment before the drugs may be adminis-
tered pursuant to the state's parens partiae power."' 2 6 The decision
was based solely upon state constitutional and common law
grounds, 127 involving (1) a broader class of drugs than any prior
opinion, 128 and (2) a regulatory scheme already approved in large
part on federal constitutional grounds by the Second Circuit.12
Rivers was a consolidated action brought on behalf of three 30 in-
voluntary31  patients at Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center, 32 who
attempted' 33 to refuse the administration of certain antipsychotic
medications. 13 4 In all instances, after the patients' objections were
123. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d at 269.
124. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, reh'g denied, 68 N.Y.2d 808
(1986).
125. Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Where a patient presents a danger
to self or others or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within the institu.
tion, the state may be warranted, under police power grounds, in administering antipsychotic
medication over the patient's objections. "The most obvious example of this is an emergency
situation, such as when there is imminent danger to a patient or others in the immediate
vicinity." Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
127. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
128. Rivers appears to be the first case involving a patient complaining about the adminis.
tration of lithium. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. Cf. Rennie v. Klein,
653 F.2d at 839 n.2 ("[D]rugs such as lithium . . . are not considered here"); Rogers v. Okin,
634 F.2d 650, 653 n.1 (ist Cir. 1980) (case exclusively concerned with antipsychotic drugs
such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin, and Haldol; drugs such as lithium not covered); Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. at 29: n.1 (adopting classification used by First Circuit in Rogers).
129. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d at 979-81, discussed supra note 91, and at
text accompanying notes 91-93.
130. The trial court's denial of class certification was affirmed "since application of the
principles of stare decisis will adequately protect subsequent litigants." Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at
499, 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
131. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1978); see generally id., §§ 9.01-
9.59.
132. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 490, 495 N.E.2d at 339, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76. This was a New
York State mental hospital.
133. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. Each patient unsuccessfully in-
voked the state administrative procedures governing refusal of medication by state hospital
patients. Under those regulations, see N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 27.8 (1983), before such
treatment is ordered over a patient's objection, the decision to medicate must be reviewed by
"the head of the service." Id. § 27.8(c). Aggrieved patients then have a right to a counseled,
id. § 27.8(d), appeal before the facility director, id. § 27.8(e)(1). That decision may then be
appealed to the regional director of the state department of mental hygiene. Id. § 27.8(e)(3).
134. Plaintiff Rivers was medicated with Prolixin Hydrochloride, Prolixin Decanoate, and
Mellaril. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 490-91, 495 N.E.2d at 339-40, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76-7. Plaintiff
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overridden, and the medications involuntarily administered, the pa-
tients filed declaratory judgment actions135 against the state commis-
sioner of mental hygiene and hospital officials "to enjoin the noncon-
sensual administration of antipsychotic drugs and to obtain a
declaration of their common-law and constitutional right to refuse
medication."136
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints on the theory that
"the involuntary retention orders necessarily determined that these
patients were so impaired by their mental illnesses that they were
unable to competently make a choice in respect to their treat-
ment."' 37 The appellate division affirmed the lower court decision.las
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the due process clause
of the state constitution'3 9 "affords involuntarily committed mental
patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medication."' 40
The court also held that "neither mental illness nor institutionaliza-
tion per se can stand as a justification for overriding an individual's
fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medication on either police
power or parens patriae grounds."' 41
Katz was medicated with Navane and Lithium, id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.2d at
77, and plaintiff Grassi was medicated with Prolixin Hydrochloride, Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at
340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
See id. at 490 n.l, 495 N.E.2d at 339 n.1, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76 n.l. (discussing both useful-
ness and side effects of "antipsychotic drugs." citing to. inter alla. Limiting the Orgy supra
note 14; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir. 1981), Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653
n.1 (Ist Cir. 1980), Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 928-29 (N.D. Ohio 1980)). The
administration of Lithium (a drug first administered in 1949, see Cade, Lithium Salts In the
Treatment of Psychotic Excitement, 36 MED. J. Ausr. 349 (1949), and given to ameliorate
manic episodes in patients with manic-depressive illness, see generally Fieve, Lithium (An-
timanic) Therapy, in 2 FREEDMAN. KAPLAN & SADOCK. COMPREHtENSIVE TExVnOOK OF Ps'-
CHIATRY I! 1982 (2d ed. 1975); see also MODERN DRUG ENCYCLOPEDIA AND TiERAPELTIC
INDEX 523 (Lewis ed. 1981)) was not specifically challenged in any of the cited cases.
135. Plaintiffs Rivers and Zatz filed one action, Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 491, 495 N.E.2d at
340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77, while plaintiff Grassi filed a separate action, Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d
at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
136. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
137. Id. at 491-92, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
138. Rivers v. Katz, 112 App. Div. 2d 926, 491 N.Y.S.2d 1011. (App. Div. 1985).
139. N.Y. Coast. art. 1, § 6. Cf. Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 498
N.Y.S. 2d 99, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985) (free speech provision of state constitution, see,
art. I, § 8, did not preclude mall owner from enforcing, in the absence of state action, blanket
no-handbilling policy, where the same court was not willing to construe the state constitution
more expansively than the United States Supreme Court had interpreted the parallel provision
of the federal constitution, see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972): cf. Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). All relevant cases are discussed in Ragosta,
Free Speech Access to Shipping Malls Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1986)).
140. Rivers, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
141. Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
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First, the court restated the established common law principles142
that "every individual of 'adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his body' "143 and to control the
course of his medical treatment. 14 4 In the case of competent patients,
this fundamental right, co-extensive with the patient's liberty inter-
est protected by the state constitution's due process clause, 145 must
be honored "even though the recommended treatment may be bene-
ficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life.' 46 The court
added:
In our system of free government, where notions of individual auton-
omy and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must have
the final say in respect to decisions regarding his medical treatment in
order to insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his
autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with the further-
ance of his own desires. . . . This right extends equally to mentally ill
persons who are not to be treated as persons of lesser status or dignity
because of their illness .... 147
142. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The court added that these princi-
ples were also recognized by the state legislature, id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d
at 78, citing to, N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2504, 2805-d (1985) N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §
4401-a (1987), and N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 405.25(a)(7)(1986).
The cited sections provided for informed consent of adult individuals in situations involving
"medical, dental, health and hospital services," N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (1985), set
out the elements of and defenses to a medical malpractice claim based on an alleged lack of
informed consent, id. § 2805-d(l) to (4), set the standard upon which to assess a motion for
judgment at the end of plaintiff's case in such an action. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4401-a
(1987), and mandate that hospitals establish written policies affording patients the right to
"refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law and to be informed of the medical conse-
quences of [their] action," N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 405.25(a)(7)(1986).
143. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 78, quoting, in part,
Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (Ct. App. 1914) (Car-
dozo, J.).
144. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78, citing inter alla,
Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (Ct. App. 1914) and.In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)(Storar
was a so-called "right to die" case holding that, where, prior to becoming incompetent, an
elderly patient had consistently expressed his views to not have his life prolonged by medical
means if there were no hope for recovery, it was proper for the court to approve discontinuance
of a respirator on which he was being maintained in a permanent vegetative state).
145. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. See Cooper v.
Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 175 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied
sub. nom. Lombard v. Cooper, 446 U.S. 984 (1980) (applying due process clause of state
constitution to question of adequacy of jail conditions); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979).
146. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78, citing Storar, 52
N.Y.2d at 377.
147. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (citations omitted).
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The court specifically rejected defendant's argument that involun-
tarily committed mental patients were "presumptively incompetent"
to exercise this right because involuntary commitment included an
implicit determination "that the patient's illness has so impaired his
judgment as to render him incapable of making decisions regarding
treatment and care."'1 4  Without more, neither the fact of mental
illness nor the fact of commitment "constitutes a sufficient basis to
conclude that [such patients] lack the mental capacity to compre-
hend the consequences of their decision to refuse medication that
poses a significant risk to their physical well-being. '140
In fact, the court stressed, the "nearly unanimous modern trend in
the courts,150 and among both medical and legal commentators,""1 is
to recognize that there is no significant relationship between the need
for hospitalization of mentally ill patients and their ability to make
treatment decisions. 1 52 It concluded on this point by quoting Profes-
sor Brooks:
[T]here is ample evidence that many patients, despite their mental
illness, are capable of making rational and knowledgeable decisions
about medications. The fact that a mental patient may disagree with
the psychiatrist's judgment about the benefit of medication outweigh-
ing the cost does not make the patient's decision incompetent.'3
On the other hand, the court recognized that the right to reject
antipsychotic medication was not absolute, and that, under certain
circumstances, it might have to yield to compelling state interests'":
an emergency situation where the patient was in "imminent danger
148. Id.
149. Id. at 494, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79. See also Rennie, 653 F.2d at 846
n.12 ("It is simply not true that all persons involuntarily committed are always incapable of
making a rational decision on treatment. . . Psychiatric literature indicates that many forms
of mental illness have a highly specific impact on the victims, leaving decision-making capacity
and reasoning ability largely unimpaired"); Rogers, 634 F.2d at 658-59.
Rivers added that it was "well-accepted that mental illness often strikes only limited areas
of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired, [and, as a result,] many mentally ill ersons
retain the capacity to function in a competent manner," Rivers, at 494. 495 N.E.2d 342, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 79, see The Constitutional Right. supra note 14. at 191; Rogers. 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979).
150. See. e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir. 1971); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
151. See, e.g., Limiting the Orgy. supra note 14, at 488; The Constitutional Right. supra
note 14, at 194-95.
152. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 494-95, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
153. Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79, quoting The Constitutional Right.
supra note 14, at 191.
154. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80. citing, inter alla
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266.
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to [another] patient or others in the immediate vicinity,"' 55 or, under
the state's parens patriae power, where an individual is "incapable of
making a competent decision concerning treatment on his own...
[or] lacks the capacity to determine for himself whether he should
take the drugs."'156
This determination, the court underscored, "is uniquely a judicial,
not a medical function,"'157 and due process thus requires that "a
court balances the individual's liberty interest against the State's as-
serted compelling need on the facts of each case to determine
whether such medication may be forcibly administered."' 8
The prior judicial determination in the later group of cases should
be in the nature of a de novo hearing, 159 following exhaustion of the
state's administrative review processes. 60 At this counseled' 6' hear-
ing, the state must bear the burden of demonstrating, by clear and
convincing evidence 62, the patient's incapacity to make a treatment
155. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80, citing, inter alla,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 27.8(b) (1962). Under this provision, facilities may treat ob-
jecting patients "where the treatment appears necessary to avoid serious harm to life or limb
of the patients themselves or others." Id. § 27.8(b)(1); see also id. § 27.8(b)(3). This excep-
tion, the court explained, was premised on the state's police power. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496,
495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80. It noted, however, that no such claim was advanced
by defendants in the case before it. In a footnote, the court explained what this exception does
not include:
Any implication that state interests unrelated to the patient's well-being or those
around him can outweigh his fundamental autonomy interest is rejected. Thus, the
State's interest in providing a therapeutic environment, in preserving the time and re-
sources of the hospital staff, in increasing the process of deinstitutionalization and in
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, while important, cannot out-
weigh the fundamental individual rights here asserted. It is the needs and desires of the
individual, not the requirements of the institution, that are paramount.
Id. at 495 n.6, 495 N.E.2d at 343 n.6, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 n.6.
Cf. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 ("In deciding this case, we have weighed those postommit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under which most
state institutions necessarily operate." (emphasis added)).
156. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80, quoting Rogers,
634 F.2d at 657.
157. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
158. Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
159. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
160. Id. citing N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14 § 27.8 (1962).
161. Id. citing N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(l)(a) (McKinney 1983) (counsel may be assigned, Inter
alia, in civil commitment proceedings if the court is satisfied the individual is financially una-
ble to obtain counsel).
162. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (intermediate burden of proof,
constitutionally mandated at civil commitment hearings, is used where "interests at stake . ,
are deemed to be more substantial that mere loss of money").
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decision.16 If the court determines that the patient has the capabil-
ity of making his own treatment decision, the state is precluded from
administering such drugs.16 On the other hand, if the court deter-
mines that the patient lacks such capacity:
The court must determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly
tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, tak-
ing into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the pa-
tient's best interest, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the
adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less intru-
sive alternative treatments. The State would bear the burden to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment
meets this criteria. 65
The court thus concluded that the state's administrative review
procedures failed to meet state constitutional muster." The regula-
tions were deficient in that they did not articulate "the standards to
be followed or criteria to be considered at each stage of the adminis-
trative process" with respect to the patient's need for a particular
drug, whether the drug is the "least intrusive," whether it is capable
of producing the "least serious side effects, and the proper length of
its use."1
6 7
"[P]articularly disturbing" was the absence of any standard for
determining the "permissible duration of forced medication":',
Manifestly, when the medication is necessitated by the patient's dan-
gerousness, a circumstance that would implicate the State's police
power interest, it may well be that the need would continue only for so
long as the dangerous condition exists. The determination would not
necessarily imply incapacity and thus would not provide a justifiable
163. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.YS.2d at 81.
164. Id. The court listed eight factors that might be considered in evaluating an individual's
capability to consent to or to refuse treatment:
(1) the person's knowledge that he had a choice to make; (2) the patient's ability to
understand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages; (3) the patient's
cognitive capacity to consider the relevant factors; (4) the absence of any interfering
pathologic perception or belief, such as a delusion concerning the decision; (5) the ab-
sence of any interfering emotional state, such as severe panic depression, euphoria or
emotional disability; (6) the absence of any interfering pathologic motivational pres-
sure; (7) the absence of any interfering pathologic relationship, such as the conviction
of helpless dependency on another person; (8) an awareness of how others view the
decision, the general social attitude toward the choices and an understanding of his
reason for deviating from the attitude if he does.
Id. citing R. Michels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in REausiNo TREATMENT IN MENTAL
HEALTH INsTITUTIONS - VALUES IN CONFLICT 115, 117-18 (1982).
165. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497-98, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.





basis for the exercise of the State's parens patriae authority to over-
ride the patient's objection or to continue the medication for a pro-
tracted period. When the medication is determined to be necessary in
order to care for a patient who is unable to care for himself because of
mental illness, the State's parens patriae power would be implicated,
which, as we have said, may only be employed when it has been deter-
mined that the patient is unable to make a treatment decision. 69
Finally, the court ruled that state law mandating that hospital
professional staff act "within the scope of professional license"170 ap-
plied to the administrative process, and held that such "medical de-
terminations as to the need to administer antipsychotic drugs must
honor the patient's due process rights and be made in accordance
with accepted professional judgment, practice and standards.111
Rivers is an important case for many reasons. First, there is virtu-
ally nothing in the opinion acknowledging the split 172 in the way
courts have construed the right to refuse treatment following the Su-
preme Court's decision in Mills17 3 and the Third Circuit's Rennie
remand decision.11 4 While there is a but see citation to Stensvad v.
Reivitz'"5 on the question of the relationship between institutional-
ization and treatment decision making capacity,7 6 a reading of Riv-
ers alone would give little indication of the range of right to refuse
treatment developments since 1982.177
Second, there is no mention whatsoever of the Project Release178
opinion in the course of Rivers. Since, in the former case, the Second
Circuit upheld the constitutionality (on federal constitutional
grounds)17 1 of the very regulation struck down on state constitutional
grounds by the Rivers court, the absence of any mention of Project
Release is particularly stark. Third, the expansion of the class of
drugs covered by the opinion to include Lithium1 80 is a significant
quantitative and qualitative increase in the universe of drugging de-
169. Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344-45, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
170. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(b)(3) (McKinney 1978). For the purpose of protect-
ing patients in their care and treatment a facility director shall require the order of a staff
member operating within the scope of a professional license for any treatment or therapy
based on appropriate examination.
171. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
172. See supra notes 89-119 and accompanying text.
173. 457 U.S. 291 (1982); see supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
174. 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); see supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
175. 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis. 1985); see supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
176. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 494, n.4, 495 N.E.2d at 342, n.4, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 n.4.
177. 457 U.S. 291 (1982), and Rennie, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), were both remanded in 1982.
178. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
179. Id. at 980-81.
180. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
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cisions in which constitutional due process decisions are now
implicated. 181
Fourth, the use in Rivers of a pre-administration judicial hearing,
similar to that ordered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in the Rogers remand 82 is a ringing endorsement of the judi-
cial model in an area where it appears likely that the United States
Supreme Court would accept a more informal, medically-focused
model so as to adequately satisfy the demands of the due process
clause of the federal constitution. 83
Fifth, Rivers' paraphrase of the "professional judgment" language
used by the United States Supreme Court in Romeo to support its
holding that, in the administrative process, "medical determinations
as to the need to administer antipsychotic drugs must honor the pa-
tient's due process rights, 184 is more than mildly ironic. The Romeo
language is now generally used to countenance more informal proce-
181. While there are important clinical side effect issues raised by the use of Lithium, see.
e.g., Mann, Greenstein & Eilers, Early Onset of Severe Dyskinesla Following Lithium-
Haloperidol Treatment, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1385 (1983) (letter to the editor); Kane, Ex-
trapyramidal Side Effects with Lithium Treatment, 135 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 851 (1978); Co-
hen & Cohen, Lithium Carbonate, Haloperidol and Irreversible Brain Damage, 230 J. A. M.
A. 1283 (1974); Spring & Frankel, New Data on Lithium and Haloperidol Incompatibility,
138 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 818 (1981); Zorumski & Bakris, Choreoathetosis Associated with
Lithium Case Report and Literature Review, 140 Ams J. PSYCHIATRY 1621 (1983); Reisbcrg
& Gordon, Side Effects Associated with Lithium Therapy, 36 ARcHivES GENERAL PSYCHIA-
TRY 879 (1979); Crews & Carpenter, Lithium-Induced Aggravation of Tardive Dyskinesla.
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 933 (1977); Shukla & Muhherjee, Lichen Simplex Chronicus During
Lithium Treatment, 141 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 909 (1984); Shukla, Lithium-Carbamazeolne
Neurotoxicity and Risk Factors, 141 Am. . PSYCHIATRY 1604 (1984); Bar Nathan, Brenner
& Horowitz, Nonspecific Stomatitis Due to Lithium Therapy, 142 Amt J. PSYCHIATRY 1126
(1985) (letter to the editor), none of these is mentioned in the course of Rivers. The decision's
"side effects footnote," see Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 490, n.l., 495 N.E.2d at 339, n.1., 504
N.Y.S.2d at 76, n.l., cf. Mills, 457 U.S. at 293, n.1 cites solely to articles and cases discussing
the narrower class of drugs before the court in Rennie and Rogers.
182. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 313-315.
183. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23 ("[Tlhere certainly is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions
[about internal operations of state mental institutions]", Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiat-
ric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface, 35 FmORY LJ. 139, 157 (1986) ("while the
'right to refuse' is a fascinating issue for law and psychiatry, the problem remains clinical").
Dr. Roth has written significantly and extensively about both the ethical and empirical is-
sues raised by the implementation of the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Roth & Apptl-
baum, What We Do and Do Not Know About Treatment Refusals In Mental Institutions, in
REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS - VALUES IN CONFUCT 179
(1982); Roth, Competency to Decide About Treatment or Research 5 INT'L J. L & PSYCHIA-
TRY 29 (1982); Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.
J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); Meisel, Roth & Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 134 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977).
184. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
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dures 85 and as a standard under which "the judgment of medical
authorities should determine the most efficacious treatment modality
that will satisfy the treatment needs of the patient,"18 not as justifi-
cation for a due process model in some ways stricter than the trial
court's original remedy in Rennie.1
8 7
Sixth, the decision's sole reliance on state constitutional law' 88
may be its most important legacy. While the trend toward the ex-
panded use of state constitutions in a variety of due process and
equal protection contexts has been well documented,8 9 the use of
such documents in deciding cases involving the rights of mental pa-
185. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269-70 (Garth, J., opinion).
186. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Pro-
cedural. Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment 39 VAND,
L. REV. 83, 105 (1986). Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 981 (2d Cir. 1983) relied
specifically on the "professional judgment" language in Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323, in its
determination that the state regulations under attack met federal constitutional muster. 722
F.2d at 981.
187. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1314 (independent psychiatrists may hold informal
hearing).
In addition, while Rennie discarded the "least intrusive means" analysis on remand in light
of Youngberg v. Romeo, 720 F.2d at 269-70 (Garth, J., opinion), (see supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text) Rivers resurrects it, without any mention of the Youngberg decision. Cf.
Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985)
(citing, in a "cf." reference, to the "professional judgment" language of Youngberg, 457 U.S.
at 321-23).
188. While the opinion cites to common law authorities as well, it notes that these protec-
tions are "co-extensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause of
our state constitution." Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
189. See generally Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the
Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier? 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 20 (1987) [hereinafter cited as
State Constitutions].
For influential judicial writings, see, e.g. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (recognized as the Magna Carta of state
Constitutional Law); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983); Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds
as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REV.
977 (1985); Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1025 (1985); Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, I I
HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 165 (1984); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills
of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1985); Mosk, Whither Thou Goest - The State Consti-
tution and Election Returns, 7 WHITTiER L. REv. 753 (1985).
For important academic writings, see, e.g., Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Ac-
tivism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1982); Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976);
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. I (1981); Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutions, 63 TEX, L. REV.
1195 (1985); Welsh, Whose Federalism? - The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil
Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819 (1983).
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tients has been far more limited.1 0 Although several important such
cases have used state constitutions as the source of finding such
rights,191 none appears to have the potential scope and impact of
Rivers.192
While it is far too early to speculate as to Rivers' ultimate impact,
it should be self-evident that it is available as a model to high courts
of other states, if they wish to "sidestep"'9 3 the Supreme Court's
decisions in Mills and Romeo and the Third Circuit's cutbacks in its
Rennie remand decision.
II. TORT LAW ISSUES
Having looked extensively at the constitutional law issues, it is
necessary to consider tort law principles in order to determine what
relationship, if any, there is between the two sets of doctrines.
In Clites v. Iowa,"" the one major case that has considered the
impact of a constitutional right to refuse treatment on tort liability,
the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's negligence verdict of
over $750,000 which had been awarded to a long-term resident of a
state facility for the mentally retarded. 9 5 The plaintiff had been in-
Not all commentators have been so favorable. See, e.g., Malt, The Dark Side of State
Court Activism, 63 TEx. L REv. 995 (1985).
190. See Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under the State Constitutions, 45 LAw &
CoNrEMP. PROBS. 7 (1982); State Constitutions, supra note 189.
191. A right to refuse treatment has been found under the state constitution in Opinion of
the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. 1983); see also Large v. Superior Court, 148
Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1986) (right to refuse treatment for mentally ill convicts);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(right to refuse treatment for incurably ill non-psychiatric patients who seek the discontinua-
tion of artificial life support systems).
For other rights of mentally disabled persons found under state constitutions, see State ex
rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.F_.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974); Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173
Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky.
1964); Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 380 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1977); In re Grady. 85 NJ. 235.
426 A.2d 467 (NJ. 1981); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760. 219
Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985); see generally State Constitutions. supra note 189.
192. It is further ironic that, while Rivers declared a broad right to refuse treatment on
state constitutional law grounds (ignoring the contrary federal constitutional decision of Pro-
ject Release), the Rennie trial court originally rejected defendants' abstention argument, in
part, because a New Jersey state trial court had previously approved - on state law grounds
- of the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs to resisting patients. See Rennie,
462 F. Supp. at 1142 and In re Hospitalization of B., 156 NJ. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760
(Super Ct. Law Div. 1977).
193. See Wexler, Seclusion and Restraint: Lessons for Law, Psychiatry and Psychology 5
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 285, 290 (1982); Current Status, supra note 28, at 132; Hostility.
supra note 56, at 83.
194. 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
195. Id. at 919.
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stitutionalized since age eleven; seven years later, hospital doctors
began to prescribe antipsychotic drugs to "curb [his] aggressive be-
havior."' 196 After receiving such drugs for five years, the plaintiff was
diagnosed as suffering from tardive dyskinesia. 19 7
The plaintiff sued in state court, arguing that the defendants had
failed to provide him with "reasonable medical treatment," and that
his condition was proximately caused by their negligence." 8 The
jury awarded him $385,000 for future medical expenses, and
$375,000 for past and future pain and suffering. The defendants ap-
pealed this verdict.199
In affirming, the court of appeals found that defendants' actions
were to be assessed by the standard of "such reasonable care and
skill as is exercised by the ordinary physician of good standing under
like circumstances, 20 0 the traditional test for negligence.20' It found,
on the record before it, that there was "substantial support" for a
series of fact-findings that the trial court had made regarding the
appropriate "industry standards of care." 20 2
Thus, while it was "standard" for patients receiving major tran-
quilizers to be "closely monitored" via tests, physical exams and reg-
ular examinations by physicians, the plaintiff had not been visited by
a physician for a three year period.20 3 The hospital staff's failure to
react to the plaintiff's symptoms and alter his treatment program
similarly fell short of industry standards, as did the hospital's failure
to provide interim consultations with specialists, especially in light of
the plaintiff's attending doctor's conceded unfamiliarity with tardive
dyskinesia. 204
Given the plaintiff's status and the type of drugs involved, the
practice of polypharmacy was not warranted by industry standards,
the court noted,205 citing the Third Circuit's original opinion in Ren-
nie on the use of the least restrictive alternative standard. 20 6 Further,
196. Id. at 918.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 919.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 908 (Iowa 1976)).
201. See, e.g., Schrempf v. State of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 289, 487 N.E.2d 883, 496
N.Y.S.2d 973 (1985); Bell v. N.Y.C. Health & Hospital Corp., 90 A.D.2d 270, 456 N.Y.S.2d
787 (App. Div. 1982).




206. Id. See also Rennie, 653 F.2d 836, 844-48 (3d Cir. 1981)(The least intrusive means
standard will not preclude all intrusions. Rather, "it merely directs attention to and requires
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the major tranquilizers which the plaintiff received were "designed
as a convenience or expediency program rather than a therapeutic
program," constituting "substandard medical conduct.1207
Finally, under Iowa state law, defendants were obliged to "make a
reasonable disclosure to [a] patient [or his guardians] of the nature
and probable consequences of the suggested or recommended treat-
ment. '20 8 This was not done in Clites. On this point, the court cited
the trial court's opinion in Rogers: "The concept of a therapeutic
alliance between doctor and patient presumes a communication of
information as to the pros and cons of a particular treatment
program. '20
Although obtaining informed written consent was a "recognized
industry standard," 210 the plaintiff's parents were "never informed of
the potential side effects of the use, and prolonged use, of major
tranquilizers, nor was consent to their use obtained. 21 On the issue
of damages, the court again found "substantial evidence" to support
the jury's verdict.
Before Timothy was administered the major tranquilizers, he exhib-
ited little aggressive or self-abusive behavior. Timothy could ade-
quately communicate his needs to others, could dress himself, comb
his hair, brush his teeth and make his bed. After the major tranquil-
izer began, a marked change occurred. Timothy became aggressive
and self-abusive. He began uncontrolled movements of his arms and
legs. There is evidence of deterioration in the results of Timothy's psy-
chological summaries and I.Q. testing. His hygiene habits worsened.
In the words of the trial court, Timothy was, after the effects of
tardive dyskinesia manifested themselves, "only a fraction of his for-
mer self."2112
While it has been predicted balefully that Clites would lead to
"increased litigation for psychiatrists," 21 3 and while there have been
avoidance of those which are unnecessary or whose cost benefit ratios, weighted from the pa-
tient's standpoint, are unacceptable." Id. at 847.
207. Clites, 322 N.W.2d at 920-21.
208. Id. at 922 (quoting Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139, 144 (1960)).
209. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979)).
210. Clites, 322 N.W.2d at 922; (the court cited, in a cf. reference, Rennie v. Klein. 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1147 (D.N.J. 1978), for the proposition that "patients must be informed of and
participate in the decision-making aspects of their treatment").
211. Clites, 322 N.W.2d at 922. The court here relied on Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1366,
1377, for the proposition that the decision to accept or refuse such medication is a "basic right
of privacy and [that] the physician-patient relationship presumes the communication of the
pros and cons of any particular treatment."
212. Id. at 923.
213. Klein and Glover, Psychiatric Malpractice, 6 IN'L J. L & PsYdlATRY 131, 137
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Klein and Glover].
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reports of increased filings in the case's aftermath,214 the expected
"flood" 215 has not yet materialized. 216 Although Clites was charac-
terized as "disquieting" by Drs. Paul Appelbaum and Robert Wett-
stein,21 those authors also suggested that it was "premature" to use
the case as a standard by which to assess the general direction of
case law developments in this area. 2 8 They suggested that the devel-
opment of "appropriate written policies and procedures for the sys-
tematic monitoring of patients being treated with antipsychotic med-
ication, whether or not tardive dyskinesia . . . [is] present" would
be the first step in limiting the future litigation risk of mental health
professionals in the field.21
Subsequently, Dr. Appelbaum and other colleagues raised the in-
triguing possibility that tardive dyskinesia should be viewed in the
same context as a "mass accident," for which there are specially-
214. See Baker, Expect a Flood of Tardive Dyskinesia Malpractice Suits, Clinical Psychia-
try News, Jan. 1984, at 3.
215. Id.
216. For a non-institutional tardive dyskinesia case incorporating constitutional principles
through state statute, see Barclay v. Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8, 10-11 (Tex. 1986) (construing
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80(a) (Vernon 1985) guaranteeing mentally ill persons
all rights provided by state and federal statutes and constitutions - to provide plaintiff with
the right to make his own "medical decisions" as an aspect of the federal constitutional right
to privacy, citing, inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); new trial ordered, to
consider the question of whether a "'reasonable person' could have been influenced in making
a decision whether to give or withhold consent to [administration of prescribed neuroleptic
drug] had he known of the risk [of tardive dyskinesia]").
Cf Faigenbaum v. Oakland Medical Center, 143 Mich. App. 303, 306, 373 N.W.2d 161,
164 (Ct. App. 1985) (subunit of state mental hospital which functioned as a general care
medical hospital immune from plaintiff's medical malpractice tort claim in tardive dyskinesia
case, applying Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984),
retroactively.
217. Wettstein and Appelbaum, Legal Liability for Tardive Dyskinesia, 35 Hosp. & CoM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 992, 993 (1984).
218. Id.
219. Id. (emphasis added). Suggested the authors:
Such policies could be included under existing guidelines with regard to the appropri-
ate use and dosage of antipsychotic and antiparkinsonian medications, but would also
address the need for periodic evaluation for tardive dyskinesia; the use of standardized
dyskinesia-assessment instruments; the role of consulting neurologists in screening, di-
agnosis and treatment of tardive dyskinesia; the availability of costly neurological diag-
nostic procedures ([EEG] or computerized tomography, for example); and the method
of securing and periodically reviewing a meaningful informed consent from the patient
or his or her guardian both on the use of antipsychotic medication and the management
of tardive dyskinesia. The formulation of such a policy demands a consensus among
clinical (psychiatric and neurologic), administrative, legal, financial, and ethical
agendas.
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created judicial remedies. 220 These potential remedies run a full
gamut from strict liability (to be enforced against "either drug man-
ufacturers or (less likely) prescribing physicians"),221 to alternative
"market-share liability" (in the same manner done by manufacturers
in the Agent Orange suits),2 22 to a new type of social insurance pro-
gram (not unlike workers' compensation), 223 to allowing the patient
to bear the burden (either as a result of an expanded assumption-of-
risk theory, a comparative negligence doctrine, or in the same man-
ner as the state-of-the-art defense used in some asbestosis cases). 22'
While these ideas do not appear to have percolated past the jour-
nal commentary stage, they are all certainly provocative, and all are
worthy of further exploration. The inescapable reality, however, is
that all of the suggestions have one factor in common: a recognition
that traditional tort remedies may not be appropriate in tardive dys-
kinesia litigation. Although these ideas are intriguing, it is prema-
ture to rush headlong into any such extraordinary compensation
scheme, especially given the near total absence of pertinent case law.
Also, psychiatric malpractice will be difficult to prove except in
grossly negligent situations (such as the Iowa case), due to problems
of causation and the inevitability of some side effects even where
medication is "responsibly and competently prescribed." 225 Beyond
this, of course, tort recoveries are solely remedies; their prophylactic
value is open to question, and they cannot restore an injured plaintiff
to the status quo ante.228 The fact that Dr. Appelbaum has raised
the issue, and that the American Journal of Psychiatry has pub-
lished his ideas as a lead article, should make it quite clear that this
is an issue which will be the focus of increased attention in mental
health circles in both the near and distant future.
Somewhat obscured in all of this is another inescapable reality:
the body of constitutional law which has developed over the past
eight years may well be incorporated into tort law cases, with the
additional overlay of traditional tort liability principles. Paradoxi-
cally, the expansion of this body of constitutional rights of patients
may actually be a financial panacea to mental health professionals
220. Appelbaum, Schaffner and Meisel, Responsibility and Compensation for Tardive Dys-
kinesia, 142 At. 3. PSYCHIATRY 806, 807 (1985).
221. Id. at 808.
222. Id. at 809.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 809-10.
225. Note, Antipsychotic Drugs: Regulating Their Use in the Private Practice of Medicine,




(institutional and otherwise): if the constitutional rights of patients
are enforced in accordance with the decisions discussed previously,
then it may be logical to infer that much otherwise-tortious behavior
will be prevented and suits will be minimized.227 Although this topic
has not yet been written about (or litigated) extensively,228 it seems
logical that further developments in this area can be expected.
CONCLUSION
Mental health professionals need to be able to predict how courts
will respond to new sets of fact situations in a whole variety of legal
areas. Although the law still remains in a state of flux, 229 it is now
clearer that most of the lower courts that have considered the ques-
tion agree that the Supreme Court is comfortable "with the theoreti-
cal underpinings of the right" 230 to refuse treatment. While the ulti-
mate definition of the scope of the right to refuse treatment remains
open231 unless and until the Supreme Court decides to hear the issue
again, it appears that the right is far from "extinguished. 2 32 In most
jurisdictions, it is, rather, alive and well.
In addition, cases such as Clites indicate that these principles will
now have a double life: in constitutional litigation involving equitable
and broad-based institutional relief, and in tort cases involving the
compensation of individuals for damages suffered because of the mis-
use of the very same medications. In either circumstance, to para-
phrase the playwright Arthur Miller in Death of a Salesman, "at-
tention must be paid."
227. Cf. Rosenberg and Yohalem, Litigation on Behalf of Mentally Disabled Children:
Target of Opportunity, Part 1, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 70, 72 (1986)
(large monetary judgments send shock waves through a state system: investigations may be
launched, culpable staff fired, staff training improved, and quality-assurance procedures
implemented).
228. But see Klein and Glover, supra note 213, at 136; Slovenko, On the Legal Aspects of
Tardive Dyskinesia, 7 J. PSYCHOLoGY & L. 295 (1980); Halleck, Malpractice in Psychiatry,
in 6 Psych. Clinics of North America 567 (Sadoff, ed. 1983).
229. See Patients' Rights. supra note 26, at 6.
230. Id.
231. Mental Hospital Drugs, supra note 14, at 1728 n.27.
232. See Common Law Remedy, supra note 27.
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